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EXERCISING OPTIONS TO REPURCHASE EMPLOYEE-HELD
STOCK: A QUESTION OF GOOD FAITH
WITHIN the context of the close corporation, options to repurchase employee-
owned stock present an opportunity for abuses that are likely to escape judicial
correction.' Because a repurchase agreement is designed primarily to induce
a valuable employee to remain with the company issuing the shares in question,
2
an exercise of the option is almost always conditioned on termination of the
employment relationship.3 Usually, the option runs to the corporation or to
certain shareholders. 4 It may last until the employee's retirement or death,5
although occasionally it expires after a term of years, the employee then re-
ceiving unrestricted ownership of the stock.6 While some agreements stipulate
I. The close corporation is usually defined as one with relatively few shareholders,
close identity between ownership and management and little or no public trading in its
shares. See Symposiun--The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 345-47 (1957). Because
share ownership by "outsiders" not actively connected with the business is considered
undesirable, various restrictions on the transfer of stock are frequently adopted, among them
options to repurchase on a stated contingency. O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock
in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HARv. L. REv. 773-76 (1952).
These options are infrequently employed by large, publicly-held corporations, for the
active public trading makes the restriction of "outsider" entrance unfeasible. See NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BD., STUDIES IN PERSONNEL POLICY No. 132, STOCK OWNERSHIP
PLANS FOR WORKERS 19 (1953). See also WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING
THE COROmRATE ExECUTIVE 503-42 (rev. ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as WASHINGTON &
ROTHSCHILD]. In any event, the percentage of outstanding shares held by a single employee
in a publicly owned corporation will usually be so small that little temptation for abuse
exists. See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BD., op. cit. supra at 12; WASHINGTON &
ROTHSCHILD 138. Accordingly, this Note will focus on the closely-held corporation.
Also, the Note, though frequently relevant to "buy-sell" agreements (binding obliga-
tions to repurchase) or first-refusal arrangements, will not discuss them as such. A leading
case involving "buy-sell" agreements is Fleitmann v. John M. Stone Cotton Mills, 186 Fed.
466 (5th Cir. 1911). For the right of first refusal, see Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp.,
17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1930). See also Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d
532 (5th Cir. 1951) (first-refusal provision combined with repurchase option).
2. Harker v. Ralston Purina Co., 45 F.2d 929, 930 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 284
U.S. 619 (1931). See generally O'Neal, supra note 1, at 807.
3. See, e.g., the agreements litigated in Palmer v. Chamblerlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir.
1951); Lawrence v. Sudman, 70 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Arensten v. Sherman
Towel Serv. Corp., 352 Ill. 327, 185 N.E. 822 (1933).
4. O'Neal, supra note 1, at 792-95. Sometimes the option may run to a trust, NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BD., op. cit. supra note 1, at 19 (Milwaukee Journal plan).
Presumably, any legal entity with power to transfer stock could retain a repurchase option.
5. See, e.g., cases cited note 3 supra.
6. See, e.g., Harker v. Ralston Purina Co., 45 F2d 929 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 619 (1931) (five-year term). Such an option is less useful to the closely-held
corporation than one which runs indefinitely. It might be adopted by promoters who
anticipated that the corporation's shares would become publicly traded and who wanted to
attract an employee with the prospect of capital gains.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
a fixed repurchase price,7 most utilize a pricing mechanism which either looks
to an extrinsic standard, such as book value,8 or (less often) leaves the terms
of repurchase to the corporate party in interest." Frequently, however, the
intrinsic value of the stock 10 rises substantially above the price that the option
holder would be required to pay.1 Since in this situation dominant share-
holders can increase the per-share worth of their holdings by reacquiring (or
having the corporation reacquire) the stock of an employee at less than fair
value, the dominant group may find it advantageous to discharge him.
12
7. See, e.g., W. 0. Barnes Co. v. Folsinski, 337 Mich. 370, 60 N.W.2d 302 (1953).
8. Book value is the most frequently used formula. O'Neal, supra note 1, at 798-99.
Other methods of computation which provide for capital appreciation include fixed price
subject to renegotiation, capitalization of earnings, and appraisal. Id. at 800-04. For an
agreement utilizing a combination of book value, capitalization of earnings, and appraisal,
see Abbott v. Abbott Motors, Inc., 113 N.Y.S2d 213 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
9. Krauss v. Kuechler, 300 Mass. 346, 15 N.E.2d 207 (1938) (price to be set by
remaining stockholders) ; New Eng. Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E. 432 (1894)
(price to be set by board of directors).
10. Intrinsic value is derived from such factors as earning power, liquidation value,
control value, the corporation's competitive position in its field, and the market price
(if available) of stock in similar corporations. See generally Eisele, Valuation of Closely
Held Stocks, 5 W. Ras. L. REv. 37, 42-47 (1953).
11. This occurs because repurchase price-fixing methods currently in use do not yield
intrinsic value at time of sale. In a period of inflation, book value-net asset value per share
-is rarely accurate because assets are generally understated on the balance sheet. More
important, the balance sheet does not reflect earning power. Indeed, for many corporations,
the balance sheet means nothing in terms of value to an investor. 1 DEWING, THE FINANCIAL
POLICY OF CoRPORATIONS 530 (5th ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as DrviNG]. Book value
is an extremely unreliable indicator of the market price of publicly traded stock. Johnson,
Shapiro & O'Meara, Valuation of Closely-Held Stdck for Federal Tax Purposes: Approach
to an Objective Method, 100 U. PA. L. Rrv. 166, 170 (1951). An option price left to the
discretion of the option holder would be likely to approach intrinsic value if high standards of
good faith obtained. In practice, however, the holder enjoys considerable latitude for indulging
his self-interest. See Krebs v. McDonald's Ex'x, 266 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1953) ; Krauss v.
Kuechler, 300 Mass. 346, 15 N.E.2d 207 (1938). A fixed price subject to renegotiation
will produce current intrinsic value only if negotiations have been carried on recently
and in good faith. See Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
If, on the other hand, the value of the stock is below the option price, the option holder
faces a difficult decision. Failure to exercise within a reasonable time after termination
or death will free the stock from restrictions under most options. See Cataldo, Stock
Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 VA. L. REv. 229, 233 (1951). But
exercise will necessitate paying more for the stock than it is worth. If, however, the price-
value differential is small, the option holder should be willing to pay the extra price to
keep the stock in friendly hands. And if the differential is large, the option holder is in a
favorable position to negotiate for a lower price in view of the restricted market for
the stock.
12. For example, in a three-man corporation with shares distributed equally, the retire-
ment of the stock of one would increase the relative holding of the others by 163%. The
actual increase in value of their holdings would depend on how much assets were decreased
by the purchase, and on the increased earning power of their 50% interests.
Some agreements contemplate that the reacquired stock will be resold to another em-
ployee at the option price. See, e.g., Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951) ;
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Despite the fact that the employee may thus be deprived of legitimate expecta-
tions, the courts, without inquiring into underlying equities, almost uniformly
uphold the exercise of close-corporation options to repurchase.13
Most courts regard repurchase options as restraints on alienation, but en-
force them if the restraints are reasonable. The prevailing view is that such
an option meets this requirement if limited in time once the employee's shares
become subject to repurchase. 1 4 Whether the price actually paid by the option
holder enables him to derive windfall gains is not considered a policy de-
terminant. 15 Indeed, although dicta indicate that the price must not be so
inadequate as to suggest fraud or constitute a forfeiture,' options have never
been judicially invalidated solely on this ground.' 7 Rather, because of the
difficulties involved in ascertaining a more accurate valuation for close-corpora-
tion stock, the courts have been adamant in their refusal to look behind an
agreement's pricing formula.' 8
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BD., op. cit. supra note 1, at 19 (Milwaukee Journal
plan). Though the corporation realizes no apparent pecuniary benefit from this transaction,
it may be securing a latent financial advantage through the shifting of share ownership to
a more valuable employee. In any event, the ultimate purchaser may be said to realize a
gain if the stock's earning power is high in relation to its price. Of course, if the reacquired
shares are resold for more than the option price, the option holder is profiting at the
employee's expense.
13. E.g., Lawrence v. Sudman, 70 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (plaintiff discharged
on Friday, rehired on Monday after stock repurchase) ; Arentsen v. Sherman Towel Serv.
Corp., 352 Ill. 327, 185 N.E. 822 (1933) (reasons for discharge not clear). But cf. Ingalls
Iron Works Co. v. Ingalls, 256 Ala. 124, 53 So. 2d 847 (1951) ; Brown v. Little, Brown
& Co., 269 Mass. 102, 168 N.E. 521 (1929) (option on "retirement" inapplicable when
employee discharged). When the stockholder has retired or died the option is almost always
enforced. See, e.g., Palmer v. Chamberlin, supra note 12 (citing cases).
14. Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 537-38 (5th Cir. 1951); Missouri ex rel.
Huffman v. Sho-Me Power Co-op., 356 Mo. 832, 204 S.W.2d 276, 280 (1947) ; Allen v.
Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957). The time
limit on exercise of the option after termination of employment is, at most, six months.
Cataldo, supra note 11, at 233.
In Greene v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A2d 249 (Ch. 1938), the court
held a repurchase option void as a restraint on alienation unless the corporation could
show "special facts" making the option necessary. The case appears to have little precedent
value, first, because the option ran for an unlimited time after termination of employment,
and second, because most closely-held corporations could probably establish the requisite
"special facts." Compare Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 331 Mass. 670, 121 N.E.2d 850
(1954) (rejecting the Greene rationale).
15. See Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., supra note 14. In fact, using a low price in
relation to market value has been judicially approved. Harker v. Ralston Purina Co.,
45 F.2d 929, 930 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 619 (1931).
16. See, e.g., New Eng. Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 154, 38 N.E. 432, 434
(1894), quoted in Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 541 (5th Cir. 1951).
17. But cf. Hardin v. Rosenthal, 213 Ga. 319, 98 S.E2d 901 (1957) (option to pur-
chase at "market value or true value" too vague to be specifically enforced).
18. See, e.g., Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161
N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957).
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As presently conceived, then, many options contain latent potentialities for
the inequitable treatment of the employee. Were he dismissed just before an
unusual corporate opportunity reached fruition, or immediately preceding
liquidation and the distribution of undervalued assets,19 his potential share of
the resulting gains could be channeled to the remaining shareholders. Or else,
if the option price were book value, the repurchase price could be artificially
lowered through the manipulation of balance sheet valuations.20 M 'ore often, ter-
mination would be prompted by a desire to secure the optionee's interest either in
high profits or in the enhanced market value of corporate assets.21 Occasionally,
his dismissal might stem not from pecuniary motives but from an attempt to
assemble a controlling block of shares.2 2 Whatever the abuse,23 it will be most
apparent if the option runs for a limited time and the employee is discharged
19. See Lawrence v. Sudman, 70 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
20. See note 11 supra. Particularly susceptible to manipulation are various contingency
and valuation reserves. Although capricious entries in these accounts are condemned,
decisions concerning them are necessarily within management's discretion. 1 DEWING
635; see, e.g., Krauss v. Kuechler, 300 Mass. 346, 15 N.E.2d 207 (1938) (bad-debt re-
serve). Current accounting practice favors classifying most contingency reserves as part
of the shareholder's equity. Amfmc-cAN INSTITUTE OF AcCOUNTANTS, RESTATEMENT AND
REVISION op ACcOUNTING BULLETINS, BULL. No. 43, at 43 (1953). To the extent that
this practice is followed, it would appear that chances for lowering book value through
the use of contingency reserves is lessened. Depreciation reserves also keep values arti-
ficially low, as some industries make a practice of relatively fast write-offs. See, e.g.,
Lawrence v. Sudman, supra note 19, at 397. Furthermore, many businesses took advantage
of the five-year write-offs for emergency facilities available during World War II and
the Korean conflict. See generally BITrKER, FEDERAL INcOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAX-
ATION 268 (2d ed. 1958) ; Schlaifer, Butters, & Hunt, Accelerated Anortication, Harv.
Bus. Rev., May 1951, p. 113; cf. Paton, Measuring Profits Under Inflation Conditions: A
Serious Problem for Accountants, 89 J. AcCOUNTANcY 16 (1950).
An option price set at par value could be reduced by reducing par. And a fixed re-
purchase price could be lowered by consolidating shares. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
§ 208, at 483 (1946).
21. Compare 1 DEWING 287.
22. This would most likely happen in the close-corporation context if the directors had
an opportunity to transfer a controlling block to an outsider and needed the emiloyce's
shares to meet their sales commitments. See Leech, Transactions it; Corporate Control,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 730-32 (1956). Although a minority stockholder who suffers from
a transaction of this type has a remedy for fraud, Schroeder v. Carroll, 192 Wis. 460, 212
N.W. 299 (1927), or may sue under SEC Rule X-10B-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949),
see Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), the employee forced
to sell after an arbitrary discharge may not be protected, Lawrence v. Sudman, 70 F. Supp.
387, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) ("cases involving purchases by majority stockholders of stock
from minority stockholders are not controlling").
23. In addition to the foregoing, a partial exercise of the option is also possible under
some option contracts. See, e.g., Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 535 (5th Cir. 1951).
Partial exercise might be deliberately undertaken to force down the price on the employee's
remaining shares, or might occur merely because sufficient funds were not available to
purchase the entire employee-owned block. If the corporation is legally able to purchase
all the stock, an "all or nothing" clause could usually be implied and the contract enforced
accordingly.
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shortly before he would have acquired unrestricted ownership of the stock.2 4
Even if his shares would have been subject to repurchase indefinitely, dis-
charge would deprive him of future dividends and-when the pricing formula
comprehends increases in value-prospective capital gains.
Arg-uably, the employee should be estopped from complaining when the
repurchase option is exercised to his disadvantage, since, according to the
courts, the terms of such an option are presumed to be the product of free,
arm's-length bargaining.25 To be sure, whether an apparently unfair repurchase
is in fact abusive depends on the original expectations of the parties. 26 And
the employee may have actually assented to unfavorable pricing provisions in
order to acquire otherwise unavailable stock. He may also have taken the risk
of arbitrary corporate action into account when agreeing to both the option
price and his salary terms.
Realistically viewed, however, the judicial assumption of free, arm's-length
bargaining appears unsound. Entrepreneurs launching a new enterprise may
adopt a valuation clause with little thought given to its subsequent operation.2 7
Frequently, the option is not embodied in the employment contract but is con-
structively imposed upon it by a charter provision which binds the employee
through a brief and usually obscure reference appearing on his stock certifi-
24. In the employee-pension field, courts view suspiciously an arbitrary termination
of employment just before an employee reaches the "point of advantage" under the pension
plan. Wallace v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 57 Ohio App. 203, 210, 13 N.E.2d
139, 142-43 (1937) (dictum), quoted in Gorr v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 91 N.W.2d
772, 783-84 (Minn. 1958).
25. See Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 541 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Lawrence v. Sudman,
70 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Arentsen v. Sherman 'Towel Serv. Corp., 352 Ill. 327,
185 N.E. 822 (1933); cf. Krebs v. McDonald's Ex'x, 266 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1953).
26. Theoretically, the employee could contract away all his rights as a shareholder.
The relevant inquiry is not whether an agreement is a restriction on alienation but whether
the situation before the court was the intended result of the agreement actually made. When
an arbitrary dismissal is not involved, the question is whether the price offered is the in-
tended one. See Moser v. Keller, 303 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. 1957), where the words "book value
as shown on the books of the bank" were interpreted to mean the value that would have
been shown if the books had been kept consistently and correctly. The Moser court under-
took a complete analysis of the balance sheet and made an adjustment of approximately
$105,000 in favor of the plaintiffs, who were shareholders of a trust which owned the
repurchased bank. See also Revloc Supply Co. v. Troxell, 281 Pa. 424, 126 At. 774
(1924), where specific performaice was denied ax. option holder because the contract
showed an intent that the employee share in the surplus that accumulated during his period
of employment, and because enforcement at par value following only two small dividends
would violate intent.
When the employee has been dismissed, determination of intent poses difficult problems,
since the termination itself will practically always be within the legitimate scope of corporate
power. See 2 FLErcHE, PRIvATE CORPORATIONS § 353 (1954). For a proposed solution
to these problems, see text accompanying notes 34-35 infra.
27. The deceptive simplicity of book value probably accounts for its popularity. O'Neal,
supra note 1, at 799. The forms for repurchase contracts cited in 2 FLETCHER, CoPoRxAToN
Folaas ANNOTATED §§ 1712-14 (3d ed.,1958), utilize only par and book value.
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cates.23 Alternatively, a bylaw amendment assented to by inadequately informed
shareholders may have created the right to repurchase. 29 Even when the option
is fully set out in an employment contract or a special agreement, a desire to
establish or maintain intrafirm camaraderie may prevent the employee, however
highly placed, from demanding explicit safeguards against reacquisition-moti-
vated dismissal.30 The less sophisticated employee may take eager advantage of
an opportunity to obtain stock without realizing that his job will become less
secure should his fellow shareholders seek to enhance their holdings following
an appreciation in the stock's value. And other employees, not suspecting that
significant gains might lead to an exercise of the option, may have accepted
employment largely in the hope of speculative profits on the stock.3 ' Thus, in
a number of instances, options to repurchase might be meaningfully classified
as contracts of adhesion.
Furthermore, the optionee's status as shareholder entitles him to greater
judicial protection than he receives. In other contexts, directors or majority
stockholders taking action adverse to minority interests are held to rigorous
standards of good faith and full disclosure.3 2 In the instant situation, the op-
tionee, having committed his time and ability to the corporation in return for
partial compensation in shares, should be accorded similar safeguards. Equity-
interest remuneration necessitates his bearing a risk of loss incommensurate
with his position as an employee.33 Though his rights as a stockholder are
28. See Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 331 Mass. 670, 121 N.E.2d 850 (1954); cf.
Weissman v. Lincoln Corp., 76 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1954) (reference to minute book setting
out stockholder's agreement held sufficient notice to creditor); Allen v. Biltmore Tissue
Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957) (incorporating restriction
by reference to bylaws meets requirements of the UNIFORm STocK TRANSFER AcT § 15,
N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 176).
29. See Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59
YALE L.J. 1040, 1041 (1950). A satisfactory agreement of this type requires careful planning
and drafting. See generally Ness, Federal Estate Tax Consequences of Agreements and
Options To Purchase Stock on Death, 49 CoLu-m. L. REv. 796 (1949) ; O'Neal, supra
note 1, at 773-816. Since close-corporation stockholders are frequently not in a position
to understand all the ramifications of such an agreement, courts should be hesitant to
conclude that the shareholders intended the agreement to subordinate the interests of thc
optionees to the dominant shareholders' personal profit.
30. One leading treatise's analysis of the bargaining situation indicates that the execu-
tive's protection against changing conditions usually lies in later renegotiations rather than
in specific contractual provisions. WAsHING'roN & RorHscHUn 36; see generally id. ch. 2.
Thus, even an executive in a seemingly strong position may rely to a large extent on
corporate good faith.
31. Such contracts are not uncommon when the business is new or not in a position
to commit itself to regular salary payments high enough to interest a key employee. See
id. at 122 n.6.
32. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955) ; Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
675 (1942) ; Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; Symposium
-The Close Carporation, 52 Nw. U.L. Ri-y. 345, 395 n.51 (1957).
33. First, any return on his stock depends on the declaration of dividends, which in
turn depends on profits and the directors' discretion. BALLANTINE, CORPoRATIONS § 231
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limited by the repurchase agreement, vesting him with shareholder status is not
a subordinate part of the agreement but underlies its essential purpose-to
retain key employees.3 4 When, therefore, the option serves not as an incentive
to continued employment but as an inducement leading to the opposite result-
discharge of the optionee by an option holder seeking to reacquire stock-a prior
understanding that the option could be exploited solely for the personal gain of
dominant shareowners should not be assumed. The courts should instead
require the option holders to show that, at the outset, the employee was made
aware of, and assented to, this possible use of the option. Similarly, if interested
parties have control over the pricing mechanism, they should be held to a high
standard of good-faith dealing, absent clear evidence of knowing consent to
their untrammeled discretion.3,
Adopting a good-faith approach, a court would first determine whether an
abuse had in fact occurred. Retirement, death, voluntary resignation, or dis-
charge for business reasons may cause an option to be exercised at a disad-
vantageous but not necessarily unfair time for the employee. Given such a cause,
(1946). If the corporation meets with financial reverses, it probably will not or cannot
exercise the repurchase option. See, e.g., Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 542 (5th
Cir. 1951) (option to repurchase not exercised during depression); N.Y. PEN. LAW §
664(5) (director who votes to purchase shares except out of surplus is guilty of misde-
meanor). If the company goes bankrupt, a claim for wages enjoys priority up to $600
per employee under the Bankruptcy Act § 64(a) (2), 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 104 (1952), and recent wage claims will not be discharged if funds are unavailable
to pay them, Bankruptcy Act § 17(a) (5), 52 Stat. 851 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §
35 (1952). But the employee-shareholder may find that he has no claim in either contract
or quantum inecruit for the money he has invested. In re Tichenor-Grand Co., 203 Fed. 720
(S.D.N.Y. 1913). Any attempt to recover in quantum ineruit for work performed will run
into difficult problems of statutory and contract interpretation, as the bankruptcy provisions
apply specifically to wages. Although this may not prevent quantum rneruit claims in some
cases, the employee who elects to take compensation in dividends may be said to take the
risk of the corporation's failure to prosper and thus, in effect, to have agreed to work for
nothing in excess of his stated salary. See Arentsen v. Sherman Towel Serv. Corp., 352
I1. 327, 185 N.E. 822 (1933).
34. See Harker v. Ralston Purina Co., 45 F.2d 929, 930 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
284 U.S. o19 (1931). Repurchase agreements are also made in the hope that the valuation
will be conclusive for estate tax purposes. Tarleau, Tax Problems in the Valuation of
Property, 25 TAx~s 520, 522 (1947). Or the price may be kept low to ensure liquidation
of an employee's estate. Ness, supra note 29, at 815. None of these purposes is served
when the corporation arbitrarily terminates employment to reacquire stock.
35. Cf. UxFORt COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-305 (2). The section legalizes mercantile con-
tracts in which price is fixed by a party in interest. It imposes a requirement that price
be set in good faith-.e., "honesty in fact," § 1-201(19), and enjoins merchants to adhere
to reasunable commercial standards of fair dealing, § 2-103(1) (b). Although the parties
to a repurchase option are not merchants, the transaction appears sufficiently analogous to
suggest applying similar standards. Since accepted valuation principles exist in the stock
transfer field, see 1 DEwiNG 281-308, courts which require good faith of interested price-
fixers, see, e.g., Krauss v. Kuechler, 300 Mass. 346, 15 N.E.2d 207 (1938), should hesitate
to enforce repurchase options when the interested party has apparently ignored these
principles.
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if the valuation mechanism was not manipulated; nor the employee's resignation
precipitated, by persons standing to gain from the repurchase, the contract
could justly be enforced according to its terms. But if it appears that the price
offered is not what the parties intended, or that the optionee's termination of
employment was engineered in order to shift income to the option holder, an
abuse is indicated.3 6 To enable the employee to demonstrate abusive conduct,
the corporation should cease to be favored with a presumption that its actions--
discharging an employee, establishing a valuation for accounts-were designed
to achieve valid business goals.37 Since the agreement itself is one-sided, and
since the corporation will have superior access to critical facts, it should assume
the burden of proving corporate good faith whenever the optionee's evidence,
together with a strict construction of the option holder's contractual powersA-
suggests a reasonable likelihood of abuse.
If the corporation is required but unable to prove its good faith, a suitable
remedy must be fashioned for the injured employee. Courts in the past, on
finding an option unenforceable, have simply denied specific performance to the
option holder, 39 a solution ill-suited to the employee's peculiar situation. Only
when liquidation is imminent or an outside market exists for the stock will
withholding specific performance leave him in a position to realize the intrinsic
value of his shares. More commonly, he will simply be "locked in" a hostile
close corporation whose stock is unsalable.40 On the other hand, if he does
sell his shares, one of the essential and universally recognized purposes of the
option agreement-preventing stock transfers to outside interests 41-may be
defeated. To preserve the expectations of both. parties to the option, the courts
36. Cf. Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (intent to frustrate re-
negotiations); Lawrence v. Sudman, 70 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (value of ships
on corporation's official books some $300,000 less than on its tax books when employee-
stockholders discharged under book-value option pending liquidation; this amount subse-
quently distributed to controlling stockholders).
37. The presumption in the corporation's favor is strong. Bad faith has not been found
in many cases where the facts might easily have led to a different conclusion. See, e.g.,
Lawrence v. Sudman, supra note 36 (plaintiff discharged on Friday, rehired on Monday
after option had been exercised; large liquidating dividend subsequently declared to majority
shareholders) ; Krauss v. Keuchler, 300 Mass. 346, 15 N.E.2d 207 (1938) (manipulating
accounts-receivable valuation) ; New Eng. Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 153, 38 N.E.
432, 438 (1894) (valuation of stock at closed meeting; no justification given for figure
reached).
38. The court must first interpret the agreement of the parties to ascertain what pro-
vision they made for the prevailing situation. If the court finds that the parties made no
provision for the conduct that has occurred, it may "fill the gap" by the process of con-
struction. See 3 CORBIN, CoxTracrs § 534 (1951). This is substantially the process followed
by the court in Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
39. See, e.g., Ingalls Iron Works Co. v. Ingalls, 256 Ala. 124, 53 So. 2d 847 (1951);
Brown v. Little, Brown & Co., 269 Mass. 102, 168 N.E. 521 (1929).
40. See Hornstein, supra note 29, at 1049. On the unfavorable position of the outside
shareholder in the close corporation, see generally Symposium-The Close Corporation,
52 Nw. U.L. REv. 345, 384-9.6 (1957).
41. See note 1 supra.
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should grant specific performance despite the option holder's bad faith, but
should not enforce a repurchase price which would enable the dominant share-
owners to derive windfall profits. When misconduct is limited to option-holder
abuse of the price-fixing formula, a correct figure under the formula should
be substituted.42 But if the complaining employee was discharged so that
his shares could be repurchased, he should be awarded their intrinsic value irre-
spective of the terms of the option.
Admittedly, this award of current, intrinsic value would sometimes over-
compensate the employee for past services. To calculate damages with more
precision, however, would be to encounter nigh-insurmountable difficulties in
ascertaining prospective gains on the stock, so that the portion of those gains
allowable for services rendered could be established.43 Absent a specific cutoff
date, the option would presumably run until the employee's death. Although
actuarial tables could be used to estimate this period, an accurate forecast of
corporate profits, much less of dividends, would be unlikely. Similarly, a pre-
diction of future capital gains under valuation clauses subsuming them would be
fraught with inaccuracies. If a fixed-term option is assumed, a theoretically
perfect computation of damages would rest on a mere guess as to when the
employee would dispose of his shares, what his profit or loss on the sale would
be, and how much he would ultimately receive in dividends. Because a deter-
mination of purely compensatory damages is thus impractical, and because
corporate bad faith here underlies the premature exercise of the option, whatever
windfall arises should accrue to the employee.
44
Although the current, intrinsic value of a closely-held corporation's stock
is difficult to determine, recognized valuation formulas applicable to readily
obtained data are available for this purpose. 45 Faced with a particular corpora-
tion and a given occasion for appraisal, the expert can choose accurately among
a number of alternative methods for establishing the worth of the company's
42. See 'Moser v. Keller, 303 S.W2d 135 (Mo. 1957) (extensive court computation
of book value necessary to carry out intent of parties). Some courts have inferred an
intent to repurchase at intrinsic value in spite of specific contract terms. See Helms v.
Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
43. A converse problem might arise if an employee who had received stock in a newly-
formed company in lieu of a high salary resigned before receiving dividends. Since dividends
in later years might well be regarded as partially compensating him for services performed
at the firm's inception, the employee might attempt to claim in quantum ineruit for the fair
value of his work. Cf. Humphrey v. Johnson, 73 Ind. App. 551, 127 N.E. 819 (1920). Unless
there is evidence of bad faith in either procuring the resignation or withholding dividends,
such a claim appears without merit. Proof of "just compensation" borders on the esoteric,
cf. Patton v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1948) ; moreover, the employee may be
said to waive any rights to future profits when he leaves voluntarily.
44. An award of intrinsic value also ignores the possibility that the employee will
mitigate damages by taking another job. A comparison of his compensation on his new
job with that on his old could prove difficult since in his new job he would be unlikely
to receive stock with identical potentialities for gain or loss.
45. For a sample valuation problem, see Eisele, Valuation of Closely Held Stocks, 5
W. REs. L. Rxv. 37, 58-61 (1953).
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shares. 46 To avoid an expensive "battle of experts" when repurchased stock
is at issue,47 the valuation problem should be referred to a special master, him-
self an expert in the field. 48 He should have access to all factual evidence which
he or the parties deem relevant, but should draw his own conclusions, not weigh
the testimony of other experts.
49
In summary, the fact that close corporations find the repurchase option useful
should not deter the courts from scrutinizing its use when gain is diverted
from an employee to dominant shareholders. The difficulties of assessing
damages and valuing closely-held stock need not and should not frustrate the
attainment of equitable results. More important, strict judicial supervision
of reacquisitions would encourage the careful drafting of option agreements
generally and pricing formulas particularly, so as to eliminate temptations for
abuse and causes for complaint.50
46. Dakin, Valuation of Close Corporations, 34 CicAGo BAR RECORD 421 (1953);
see 1 DEVING 280-307.
47. One firm which specializes in valuation of close corporation stocks charges from
$50 to $300 per day for the preparation of a report. A detailed report on a complicated
corporation may cost as much as $12,000. The company's fee for providing expert testimony
is $300 per day. Letter to the Yale Late Journal, Dec. 23, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library.
48. For the dilemma of a judge faced with conflicting expert testimony, see, e.g.,
Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1954) (analysis of factors influenc-
ing stock valuation in a gift tax case).
49. Admittedly, the master's finding would simply be an expert opinion and subject
to the criticism generally leveled at the "all factors" approach. See, e.g., Johnson, Shapiro
& O'Meara, Valuation of Closely-Held Stock for Federal Tax Purposes: Approach to an
Objective Method, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 167-69 (1951) ; Rice, The Valuation of Close
Held Stocks: A Lottery in Federal Taxation, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 367, 371-77 (1950). In
this situation, however, he would be disinterested, and possibly in a better position to
justify his finding than a judge faced with a choice among several expert views.
A broad right of appeal from the master's finding would involve many of the evils of
the battle of experts. Thus, in a case in which the parties themselves had provided a
formula which included appraisal if disagreement occurred as to book value, the court
summarily dismissed an attempt to appeal the findings. Abbott v. Abbott Motors, 113
N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
50. The draftsman may wish to provide different repurchase prices for different con-
tingencies, make provision for periodic renegotiations of price, or set up an appraisal pro-
cedure which takes account of going-concern value. See generally O'Neal, supra note 1, at
773-816. Since the benefits of a carefully drafted option which is fair to both parties
seemingly outweigh any possibility of gain from an ironclad agreement specifically providing
for arbitrary dismissals, it appears likely that this course would be followed.
Another possible effect might be reluctance to issue stock to employees. This does
not seem undesirable, as many of the legitimate purposes for issuing stock to employees
subject to restrictions can be achieved by other means which do not expose the employee
to the risks of share ownership. E.g., profit sharing plans established by depositing shares
in trust, see WASHINGTON & ROTRSCHILD 488-502 (Chrysler Corp. plan) ; profit sharing
contracts, see id. at 456-63.
